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BOOK REVIEWS 
ScmNCS o:F LEG.AI, Mm.<HOD. Select Essays by Various Authors. Translatlon 
by Ernest Bruncken, Washington, D. C. and Layton B. Register of 
the University of Pennsylvania Law School. With Introductions by 
Henry N. Sheldon, Former justice of the Supreme Judicial Court 
of Massachusetts and by J oho W. Salmond, Solicitor General of 
New Zealand. Boston: The Boston Book Company, 1917; pp. 
lxxxvi, 593. 
Although the several volumes of the Legal ,Philosophy Series have been 
received with the grateful approval of many lawyers and others who were 
seeking for a solution of the difficult problems arising on the border land be-
tween metaphysics and law, this approval has been by no means unanimous, 
the criticisms coming from the metaphysicians, the jurists and the lawyers. 
The first say this is not philosophy (Cf. 13 MrcH. L. REv. 715) ; the second 
say it is bad law (Cf. 27 HARV. L. R!w. 718) ; the last say it is all nonsense 
(Cf. 16 MICH. L. REv. 287-375, passim). The preceding volumes of the Series 
have been frankly philosophical. The present volume, however, as its title 
indicates, if philosophical at all, is pragmatic rather than metaphysical. We 
are here dealing not with what jurisprudence is but with what you can do 
with it, or for it; 've are not attempting to investigate the nature of justice, 
but are trying to see how we may best attain it. 
This volume contains essays from the French scholars, Geny and Lambert; 
the Chilean Alvarez; the Germans : Ehrlich, Gmelin, Berolzheimer, Kohler, 
Gerland and Wurzel; the Professor of Law at the Law School of Nagyvarad 
(Grosswardein) Hungary, Dr. Geza Kiss; and our own jurists, Dean Pound 
and Professor Freund. The editorial preface contains an illuminating dis-
cussion of the Judicial Function by Dean Wigmore, and of the Legislative 
Function, by Professor Kocowrek.. There is also a short introduction by 
Judge Sheldon of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts and another by Solici-
tor General John W. Salmond of New Zealand. This constitutes certainly 
a cosmopolitan and imposing array, and it is interesting to note that despite 
the varying nationalities of the writers and the different characteristics of 
the legal system under which they are working, the problem of interpreta-
tion is the same and its solution under one system is essentially identical 
with that under every other system. All deal with the practical question 
as to how statutory law or its equivalent the doctrine of the decided case 
may be extended by proper methods of judicial thinking to meet new situa-
tions and establish new rights. 
Geny says in regard to this (p. 45) : "the courts are led, without exceed-
ing the well-known limits of private law, whenever they have no formal 
guidance furnished by statute or established custom, to search for light among 
the social elements of every kind that are the living force behind the facts 
they deal with, if they wish to proceed with any assurance of being right." 
Wurzel, by a psychological devise that he calls "projection," would 'extend 
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the concept found in formulated law to phenomena which were not origin-
ally contained in the concept, without, however, changing the nature of the 
concept as such'; while Kohler would interpret a rule of law socfologically, 
that is, 'as a product of the whole people whose organ the law-maker bas 
become.' The French professor, the Austrian jurist and the German legal 
philosopher are thus in agreement on the doctrine of the interpretation of a 
rule of law by a proper exercise of free judicial decision. Dean Pound calls 
attention to the' fact (p. 225) that our own Supreme Court has already taken 
a long step in the same direction. Justice Hor,:r.n:s' statement in Lochner v. 
New York, 198 U. S. 45, that, "The decision will depend on a judgment or 
intuition more subtle than any articulate major premise," though given in a 
dissenting opinion seems to have received the endorsement of the Court in 
Muller v. Oregon, 2o8 U. S. 412, in which Mr. Justice BREW:r:it said, "We 
take judicial cognizance of matters of general knowledge." 
·If this last decision is good law, it would seem that not only the various 
continental countries but also our own highest tribunal have by different 
routes arrived at the same destination and this too, not by any conscious imi-
tation of the one by the other but because of the irresistible logic of the 
situations in which the courts have found themselves. 
The Science of Law and possibly the entire Legal Philosophy Series would 
thus seem to be justified; philosophically, because jurists in different parts of 
the world and under diverse systems of law have been inevitably carried to 
the same goal in their search for a broader and more perfect justice; legally, 
because the results arrived at are not out of harmony with the several sys-
tems of law under which they have been reached. Josl!PH H. DRAKS. 
W.AIWR D1s'.rRIBUTS> A'MONG 'rH~ DSPARTM~'rs Ex.~CTlON, EsTOPPn., CoN-
'tRACT, RJ:r,us~. By John S. Ewart, K. C., LL. D. Foreword by 
Roscoe Pound, Ph. D., LL. D. · Cambridge, Harvard University 
Press, 1917; pp. XX, 304. 
Until the appearance of the illuminating discussions of Dr. Ewart in this 
and allied fields began to appear, that word the meaning of which was least 
well understood, the word most often used in judicial fog and legal delirium, 
was "waiver." In the whole territory of , the law there was no other so 
popular a "city of refuge" for a soul lost in the legal wilderness as that one 
over whose wide open gates was written "waiver.'' 
It seems not too much to say of this book, "Waiver Distributed," that it 
is entitled to take its place among the modem legal classics, of which, in 
this age of digests and compilations, it is a satisfaction to believe we have 
a few. It is a study, not so much upon authority in the sense that the author 
is attempting to discover in judicial utterance or other authoritative discus-
sion the principles involved, as it is an attempt to show that jurists and other 
legal writers have failed to discover the legal concepts hidden in the term 
"waiver," and in this his attempt amounts to a demonstration. 
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While the treatment is notably that of a scholar it is not academic but in-
tensely practical. In this book Dr. Ewart has rendered a real and very 
substantial service in several branches of the law. This is peculiarly true as 
to the law of insurance and that of landlord and tenant where the term 
waiver is almost ubiquitous. Had this book been written a half century 
earlier many of the vagaries now found in the law of insurance would never 
have developed. Although the faulty and inaccurate use of this term may 
not be so outstanding in other branches of the law, it is all too common in 
that of landlord and tenant and in some other phases of the law of contract. 
It is too much to hope that courts are at once going to make clear dis-
tinctions between "election" and "waiver,'' "estoppel" and "waiver,'' "con-
tract" and "waiver," for "waiver" is too convenient a word for the loose 
thinking lawyer. But the ideas here promulgated and distinctions drawn are 
bound gradually to work their way into the law to its real enrichment and 
to the great satisfaction of the discriminating lawyer. 
The reader can by no means afford to miss the scholarly, pungent and 
characteristic foreword of Professor Pound. 
As is appropriate for so good a book it is attractively printed and ser-
viceably bound. VIcroR H. LAID:. 
EQUITY IN ITs Rn.ATIONS ro Co:r.i:MoN LAW, by William W. Billson, of the 
Minnesota Bar. Boston. The Boston Book Comapny, 1917; pp. 
xii, 283. 
The thesis which this book is written to support is that in the last analysis 
equitable rights are proprietary. Mr. Billson is under the ~mpression that the 
contrary teaching of Langdell is still accepted without question in most law 
schools and that hence the time is come for a careful study of questions 
"which appear never to have received as systematic discussion as they de-
serve. • . " • To anyone who is familiar with Dean Pound's masterly 
expositipn of equity, or with Professor Hohfeld's articles, Mr. Billson's 
thesis will not appear as novel as he naively assumes. His book comes too 
late to inaugurate a revolution; though the author's conclusions will perhaps 
find general acceptance, it is because of arguments other than his own. The 
discussion of the development of equitable interests in Huston's "The En-
forcement of Decrees in Equity" is much more convincing. 
Had Mr. Billson confined himself to modem cases, his book would be 
briefer but more valuable. In the last two chapters he shows distinct ability 
in analysis and his conclusions are stated forcefully. But the foundation upon 
which he seeks to build is thoroughly unsubstantial. Without any first-hand 
acquaintance with mediaeval English law he attempts to write history;. with 
a very imperfect knowledge of Roman law he devotes a chapter to "Law's 
Dualism in Rome and England." The result is what might be anticipated: 
there is neither history nor comparative law. The weakness of this portion 
of the book goes far to destroy the usefulness of the whole. 
WmARD BABBoUR. 
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Tm LAw oF T~PH AND Tir.:£PHON:E CoMPAN:IEs, INCLUDING ELECTRIC 
LAW. Second Edition, by S. Walter Jones, Dean of the University 
of Memphis Law School. Kansas City. Vernor Law Book Co. 
1916; pp. xxiv, 1o65. 
The first edition of this work appeared in 1go6. That it has survived for 
a decade and has been used by lawyers and cited by the courts sufficiently to 
justify a second edition is in itself a favorable criticism of the author's efforts 
to gather into' one volume the legal rules and principles likely to arise in 
connection with the use of the telegraph and telephone. In the second edi-
tion the author has included "Electric Law," whatever that may be. It seems 
to be, as used in this work, the law applied to the use of electricity for power 
and light in so far as it is similar to or identical with the law of the telegraph 
and telephone. As power and light companies, like telegraph companies, use 
poles and wires, and serve the public directly, or else furnish current to 
electric railways that serve the public, it is manifest there will be many com-
mon topics. This is especially true in such subjects as Liabilities for Injuries, 
in Chapter IX, and Duty to Furnish Equal Facilities, in Chapter XI. An 
examination of the latter chapter, however, shows how little value the book 
has outside the field of the telegraph and telephone. The duties of other 
electric companies are so inadequately treated that they might as well have 
been omitted. 
The author and the publishers deserve special commendation for avoid-
ing that rock on which most new editions of law books have been falling 
with the calamitous result that each volume is broken into two or three. 
The second edition is kept within substantially the same compass as the first, 
typographical condensations largely offsetting the added matter of text and 
notes. 
If it was not suggested by the subject of the book, it would become ap-
parent on a glance at the table of contents that this, like many another legal 
volume found convenient by the profession, is not a treatise on any branch 
of the law; such for example, as contracts, pleading, agency, or evidence. It 
does not even on a logical plan develope the law of related subjects, like a 
-work on public service law or insurance law. Instead it is a handy collection 
of chapters from various branches of the law, in which are involved problems 
a lawyer must deal with in actions by and against telegraph and telephone 
companies. Such a lawyer, whatever the nature of his case, or the relation 
of his client to his adversary, whether the case arises out of a message or the 
location of a wire or pole, will naturally look in such a book as this for aicl, 
and he is pretty sure to find something, and to find it well and clearly stated 
and well supported by authorities. E. C. GoDDARD. 
A11t:£RICAN CIVIr. LAW CHURCH LAW, by Carl Zollman, LL. B. New York, 
Columbia University, Longmans, Green & Co. Agents 1917, pp. 473. 
Here at last is a book covering a field hitherto neglected. Most books 
merely add another to an already long list in the same field. Not only is there 
no book on American ecclesiastical law as it has grown to the present, but 
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there never has been an adequate treatment of the subject. Because of the 
separation of church and state in this country we have no ecclesiastical courts 
and ecclesiastical law in the sense in which they exist in England, and it 
seems to have been quite generally assumed by writers that there is no 
American ecclesiastical law. But this is far from the fact. Various church 
bodies are in a sense courts, and pass on ecclesiastical questions with final 
authority. But there are many ecclesiastical questions affecting civil rights, 
and these have given rise to a great number of cases in our civil courts. As 
is shown in the title, it is of the law governing these latter questions that the 
present work treats. And the treatment is adequate and satisfacory, a real 
contribution. Of only a few books can as much be said with assurance. 
After a consideration of religious liberty under our Federal and State 
Constitutions and laws, the author discusses church corporations and constitu-
tions. One of the most interesting subjects is treated under implied trusts, 
scisms and church decisions. The power of dead and buried donors of money 
to church property and uses to lay their dead hands on the present day users 
of such property and for all time limit its use to the propagation of ideas and 
beliefs that may long since have become practically obsolete is seriou~ enough 
in case of express trusts in which the intent of the donor has been clearly 
expressed. It might be still more so if the courts really carried out the doc-
trine of implied trusts by restricting the use of church funds and property 
in ways which are often quite contrary to any proved or probable intent of 
the donors. As a rule they do not. As the author points out in Chapters VI 
and VIII courts usually find a way to avoid results of the doctrine of implied 
trusts that are absurd. To paraphrase, if they did not it would be to com-
mand religion to halt in its progress, and to stretch the church upon a veri-
table bed of Procrustes. We cannot but regret that the author felt it was 
necessary to omit the discussion of charitable trusts as affecting various 
denominations, and express the hope that he will carry out his intention to 
cover that very interesting field in a separate volume. 
E. c. GoDDAIUl. 
IMPORTANT Fimr:RAI. LAWS. Compiled by John A. Lapp, LL. D., Director of 
Indiana Bureau of Legislative Information; Member of Executive 
Committee of the National Drafting Conference. B. F. Bowen & 
Co. Indianapolis. 1917; pp. xY. 933. 
This is an addition to the handy reference library which is alawys growing 
by the addition of compilations many of wJ.tich are obsolete, or so out of date 
as to be untrustworthy, almost as soon as issued. The compiler of this 
single volume collection of Acts of Congress which seems to him of general 
interest calls attention to the significant fact that of the important acts in 
the volume more than two thirds haYe been enacted or completely revised 
since 1910, and more than one-half since June 1916. It was plain that by 
June, 1917 so many more changes would be enacted that the volume would 
be out of date when it left the press in 1917. Such was the fact, and the 
publishers met the situation by issuing almost simultaneously with the book 
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a pamphlet supplement of 1917. If sales are enough to justify such action, it 
is to be presumed further supplements will be issued at frequent intervals, 
to be succeeded at longer intervals by new editions of the book itself. 
There are in the compilation acts on eighty subjects, grouped under twenty 
heads and involving considerably over one hundred Acts of Congress. One 
having access to a good law library can, of course, readily find all these and 
many more in the United States Statutes at Large, Compiled Statutes, or 
Federal Statutes Annotated. He may however find it convenient to have on 
his own shelves in a single volume some statutes to which he will have most 
occasion to refer. Evidently the compiler has in mind the need not merely 
of the layman who might want to read the law on interstate commerce, 
taxation, labor and food regulations, etc., but also the lawyer, for he includes 
the Federal Judicial and Criminal Codes, Bankruptcy Act, trademark and 
copyright laws. He omits the patent laws and some others that another com-
piler would have preferred to some of those included. The ordinary citizen, 
however, will find here most of the Federal statutes concerning him as an 
individual, especially the recent legislation growing out of the war, and those 
having to do with labor and business. E. C. GoDDARD. 
HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL PRoctDu~, by Wm. L. Clark, Jr., Second Edition, by 
\Villiam E. Mickell, B. S., L. L. M., Professor of Law in the Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania. St. Paul: West Publishing, Co., 1918. 
Clark's Criminal Procedure has been well and favorably known to stu-
dents preparing for the profession of the law and in less degree to lawyers 
for more· than twenty years. It is an elemep.tary work of the Hornbook 
Series. The second edition now given to the public is the outgrowth of 
facts and events stated by the learned Editor substantially as follows : The 
law governing criminal procedure has undergone considerable change in the 
two decades since the original edition appeared. This change has been 
brought about partly by statutory enactment and partly by judicial legislation. 
The change wrought by both these agencies has been in the same direction-
toward a more rational system of procedural law. The super-technicalities 
once dominating criminal procedure are yearly attacked by legislatures and 
daily meeting with less respect by the courts. 
Out of these facts and events the learned editor finds reason for conclud-
ing that this second edition is not only justified but necessary. The second 
edition differs from the first in no very material or substantial way. Some 
few changes in the original text have been made. These changes consist 
in the main of amplification of the statement of the rule or principle rather 
than in change of its essence. With comparatively few exceptions the 
cases cited in the first ·edition are repeated in the second. Something like 
a thousand additional cases are cited. These form the basis of new notes. 
This second edition does not give the impression that any wholesale or 
•vonderful transformation has taken place in the substantials of criminal 
?rocedure during the last two decades or that startling or exceptional changes 
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have been made in the essentials, but it does give evidence, of what would 
be desired and expected, a wholesale, moderate, sane, conservative reform 
no so much of the essentials as of the non-essentials of criminal procedure, 
to the end always that exact and speedy justice may be done alike to prosecu-
tor and accused R. E. BuN~ 
TH:e ARGENTINE CML Con:e (Effective January 1, :r871). Together with 
Constitution 'and Law of Civil Registry. Translated by Frank L. 
Joannini, from the Original Spanish Texts as Officially Promulgated. 
Revision Committee: Phanor J. Eder, Robert J.Kerr, Joseph Wheless, 
Boston, U. S. A. Boston Book Company, 1917, pp. xxxii., 732 
This volume is published under the auspices of the Comparative Law 
Bureau of the American Bar Association, in the Foreign Civil Code Series. 
The translator, who has already proved his capacity in several translations 
for the Bureau of Insular affairs, has wisely transliterated civil law terms in-
stead of attempting to find common law translations for them, and has then 
put into an extensive index-more than one hundred papers-the neces-
sary help for those unacquainted with civil law phraseology. The well 
written introduction by Mr. Eder gives a sketch of the history of Argentine 
law, the sources of the codes and the relations of the Civil Code to other 
parts of the law, together with a very good bibliography of Argentine law. 
This Argentine Code is a "one man code." It was drawn up by Dr. Velez 
Sarsfield, one of the most distinguished of the Argentine jurists of his day, 
and "was enacted into law, without any discussion whatsoever, on September 
29, x86g." He used as the basis for his codification the Project of Civil Code 
for Brazil, by Freitas, and drew from this source more than fifteen hundred 
of the four thousand and eighty-five articles. The remaining articles were 
taken from various other codes and commentaries on Roman law, and include 
eleven hundred articles from the French Code and fifty-two from the Louisi-
ana Civil Code. The classification is one based on rights rather than on rules 
of law, the first book being on persons and personal rights in family relations, 
the second on personal rights in civil actions, the third on real rights and the 
fourth on the transmission of rights in general. Whether this is more than a 
mere change in phraseology seems doubtful; at any rate, as being only a mat-
ter of classification, it is not very important. The translation is clear and in 
general free of the foreign idiom. The original avoids wherever possible the 
abstract definition of a legal institution but instead states concise premises on 
which the institution rests, thus .avoiding the feature of our Louisiana Civil 
Code that has been so often criticised and giving due heed to the warning 
of Javolenus that omnis definition in jure civili periculosa est. The transla-
tion is a timely and welcome addition to our legal apparatus for dealing with 
our great sister republic to the south in the many readjustments of world 
relations that are to come after the war. Jos:ePH H. DRA:Kr:. 

